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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Scope of this report  
The Essence project, funded by the CIPS EU programme, was designed to evaluate costs and benefits of 
applying emerging security standards to the European power grid controls systems, based on two case 
studies. Industrial control systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that might affect large portions of the 
European power system, due to the interconnection of this last, making repair difficult and causing huge 
societal and economic impact. To counter this threat, which is common to several networked infrastructures 
such as the oil and gas and the water networks, as well as power, oil and chemical process plants, several 
standard frameworks are being proposed. 
When more than two years ago this project has been conceived, a lot of work on the definition and also on 
the technical assessment of standards against malicious attacks had been done. Nevertheless, in Europe no 
clear position had emerged and, even, some standards had failed to be completed for years. Substantially it 
was hard to come to a full stop, because of many reasons, but one of them was the lack of concrete 
experience on what generalized standard compliance would imply. The USA experience showed that 
applying a standard is cumbersome and costly, that benefits are unclear and their perception depends a lot on 
the political mood of the period. But how much this judgment could be transferred in Europe was unclear as 
well. In Europe the actual situation of the electricity infrastructure is generally more updated, but the public 
opinion has a lower appreciation of security and defence countermeasures.  
The idea that moved the promoters of the project was that, to exit this impasse, two dimensions were 
necessary:  
- Concreteness. Only a close look into some real electricity facilities could lead to detailed and 
grounded estimates of the impacts of standards for European utilities. 
- Multidisciplinary integration of technical and socio-economic assessment2. To identify costs and 
benefits on an objective basis, it is necessary that the economic evaluation reflects precisely the 
detailed features of the compliance process on the one hand; and on the other that this assessment is 
based on the characteristics (time, duration, geographical area and type of customers involved) of the 
simulated blackouts caused by malicious cyber-attacks.  
 
This report goes through the two Essence case studies, based on an Italian generation company and on the 
Polish Transmission System Operator (TSO) and browses the main findings of the two activities of analysis 
                                                     
2 For this reason we accepted the challenge of integrating a very heterogeneous partnership, composed of:  
- one multinational generation company (Enel) and one TSO (PSE), to consider the operation point of view.;  
- furthermore two consultancy firms specialized in risk assessment and in security of the control systems in the electricity sector 
(ADC) 
- from the socio-economic side, IEN, a research body specialized on energy and electricity, University of Western Piedmont, with 
competencies on utility regulation and management, and CNR, an Institute of CNR specialized in industrial economics, policy 
evaluation, and accountancy data management. 
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(cost of standard compliance and benefit analysis) that have been carried out. The case studies concern very 
concrete simulations of likely situations in which an attack performed by a cyber-terrorist could take 
advantage of some vulnerabilities of the system and generate huge effects in terms of generalised black-outs. 
For this reason the results of the two case studies will be summarized in this report so as to drop any critical 
information. But these reports would like to go beyond a mere presentation of the main findings, assessing 
the methodology adopted and the features of the results which stem from this methodology. This assessment 
will lead to verifying whether there is room for improvement, above all in terms of reliability, precision and 
generality of estimates.  
The aim of this assessment is not only to discuss and validate the results, but also to bridge them towards 
future challenges and research directions which are still to be explored. In particular, as underlined above, 
the main peculiarity of the Essence approach is its concreteness, deriving from the strict connection of the 
two simulations to the actual situation of two electricity utilities. But this concreteness is to the detriment of 
generality. Essence case studies highlight a feasible methodology to assess the impact in specific situations, 
but the final issue for its legacy is how to transform this methodological tutorial in a sound assessment at a 
EU27 scale.  
1.2 Evaluating the cost-benefit analysis: background 
The mission of the Essence project is to evaluate the effect of a particular type of policy, i.e. a regulation 
imposing the adoption of a particular standard. The perspective is then that of impact analysis, which 
requires assessing the effect of a policy on an outcome variable. To correctly isolate the effect of the policy it 
is necessary to compare two situations that differ just in the presence of the regulation.  
For this reason the first dimension of the evaluation concerns the implementation of standards, and is the 
comparison between: 
- A situation without regulation, where each firm autonomously decides a certain level of protections 
and undertakes consequently some investments and countermeasures which turn into some security 
costs; 
- A regulated situation in which the minimum level of protection is established by the regulation itself, 
and which, in the case of Essence is represented by one security standard. The security cost is 
expected to be higher because, in the opposite situation (i.e. all firms investing by their own the 
correct level of resources in security, and would incur in no increase in costs) regulation would not 
be necessary3. 
But in the case of security countermeasures, the assessment becomes more complicated because, whereas 
security costs are incurred in any case, security benefits emerge only in case of an attack whose 
consequences the countermeasures were designed to nullify or mitigate. To assess the benefits it will then be 
necessary to introduce a new dimension of evaluation, concerning the attack scenario. The evaluation 
compares the electricity system performances in two situations: 
- Without cyber-attack. 
- With cyber-attack. 
                                                     
3 The need for a regulation is clearly highlighted by Essence results which will be presented in this report, and is discussed in the 
conclusions.  
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Of course relevant attacks are only those that really do threat the system operations, and which could 
overcome present countermeasures. It is in fact hardly imaginable a situation of a firm without any 
protection. Table 1 summarises the evaluation scheme. 
TABLE 1: DIMENSIONS FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE TRIALS 
 Standard implementation (regulation) 
No. Every firm has 
freely implemented 
some countermeasures 
Yes. All firm are 
requested to adopt an 
equal and higher number 
of countermeasures 
Attack 
scenario 
No relevant attack to the system   
Yes, some attack is ongoing and can 
interfere with the system operations 
  
 
In any cell of Table 1 one has to calculate: 
- The cost of running security measures. They should be the same per column except for costs 
associated with taking emergency actions in response to attacks (the so called recovery costs). 
- The cost of producing (or purchasing) electricity and the cost of supplying it (in normal conditions and 
in case the attack causes disturbances able to disturb the operative management of electricity 
supply). 
- The effect of interruptions in supply on the economy and the society (only in case the attack causes 
major disturbances which cause black-outs). 
In both cases – countermeasure implementation and consequences of black-outs or other disturbances - the 
view must encompass the whole electricity system and not just a single operator or part. Although the 
unbundling process, which has been necessary for the introduction of competition in some phases of the 
electricity supply, has separated the operation of different phases in electricity supply, security has to be 
guaranteed for the whole system (generation, distribution, transmission) because its parts are interconnected, 
and failures in the protection infrastructure at any point may have consequences at all levels. This of course 
introduces some difficulty in the assessment because costs and benefits have to be estimated taking into 
account what happens all along the production chain, no matters it happens to be managed by different firms. 
The partial view is not only incomplete, but in some particular cases could prove misleading. For example it 
might happen that thanks to the attack, which causes a reduction in general supply, the local market prices 
increase and some firms might earn more, and even take advantage of the situation strategically so 
hampering the restoration of normal conditions. 
The impact evaluation is based on some monetary indicators, which are explained in the following Table 2 
and Table 3. 
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TABLE 2: SCHEMA OF ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE IMPACT EVALUATION 
 
Evaluation 
item 
Protection 
scenario 
Attack 
scenario 
Cost 
category 
Output of simulation  
Output of case study / 
additional information 
available, from other 
sources 
Description of indicators and type of information 
A 
Current situation 
and 
coutermeasures 
Attack NO 
Operative 
cost of power 
supply 
How much does it 
cost to supply 
electricity without 
attack and without the 
standard? 
 
Total cost of production (or price of purchase) of the energy 
(generation + imports) exchanged in the scenario.  
B 
Current situation 
and 
coutermeasures 
Attack NO 
Operative 
cost of 
security 
 
How much does it cost 
to manage actual 
security systems? 
Cost to maintain countermeasures operative and in service 
(personnel, material, and asset depreciation), associated with the 
present level of protection against cyber-attacks. 
C 
Current situation 
and 
coutermeasures 
Attack 
Yes 
Operative 
cost of power 
supply 
(higher; 
internal cost) 
How much does it 
cost to supply 
electricity in case of 
attack? 
 
Total cost or price of the energy used in the scenario (in case of not 
complete black-out). The expected increase in costs is associated 
with the difficulty to supply power4 
                                                     
4 In case of lower load and some losses in generation units, the average cost or price, is expected to be higher but could also be lower than the previous values. This increase (reduction) is a cost (benefit) for the 
company. 
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D 
Current situation 
and 
coutermeasures 
Attack 
Yes 
Cost of black-
out 
Which region will 
be affected by the 
blackout? For how 
long? 
Characteristics of the 
customers not supplied? 
The cost of the Blackout could be divided into: Cost for the company 
(physical destruction of equipment and cost of spare parts to be 
replaced, harm to employees) and the losses generated to clients due 
the black-out. The last one depends on their characteristics and on 
black-out duration and time venue.5  
E 
Current situation 
and 
coutermeasures 
Attack 
Yes 
Increase in cost 
of security 
(emergency 
action) 
 
How much would it cost 
to run current security 
countermeasures under 
attack? 
The expected increase in ordinary is associated to costs associated 
with taking emergency action in response to attacks. (Recovery 
costs) 
F 
Standard 
countermeasures 
Attack NO 
Operative 
direct cost of 
security 
 
How much does it cost 
every year to manage the 
countermeasures 
necessary to comply with 
the standard? 
Current personnel and SW costs associated to security monitoring 
systems and security configuration management, considering a level 
of protection from cyber-attacks (each level has a different cost) 
suitable for the standard and the type of plant: personnel (internal or 
external) costs, personnel continuous training, enterprise-wide 
licensing, annual maintenance, ongoing compliance resource 
requirements. Transitory losses in productivity due to unfamiliar 
procedures and permanent losses in productivity due to time to 
comply security requirements should also be assessed. 
                                                     
5 This item assesses mainly the direct or indirect costs (or reduction in utility) that customers face in case of interruption. This effect varies according to type of customers and their activities. So a lot of 
heterogeneous information has to be collected: type of consumers (industrial by size, commercial and services; residential, agriculture). Data on the economic and social  direct and indirect impacts . Time of the 
interruption, number of consumers and their position in space. 
Rapporto Tecnico, Anno 9, n° 57, Dicembre 2014                                                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                                        12                                                                                                                 
G 
Standard 
countermeasures 
Attack NO 
Investment 
(Depreciation)  
How much has to be 
spent to comply with the 
standard starting from 
the current situation? 
Which is the duration of 
investments (in order to 
calculate depreciations)? 
New monitoring systems (HW and SW components)for plant 
components and infrastructures, for the level of protection indicated 
by the standard or suitable to the type of plant (each level has 
different cost). This may include a number of HW and SW for the 
implementation of the countermeasures (antivirus protection, backup 
infrastructure, data loss prevention, SCADA protocols validation, 
firewall and IPS protection, LAN segmentation, communication 
confidentiality, and so on), as well as training for the employees. 
Investment may also concern, in case of plants already protected in 
some way, the cost to adapt previous SW, HW and infrastructure to 
the requirements. In this case analysis of devices in order to verify if 
they fit in standard requirements and, eventually, cost associated to 
the change and the cost of tool integration.  
H 
Standard 
countermeasures 
Attack NO 
Operative cost 
of power 
supply (it will 
probably be 
higher than 
without the 
standard) 
How much does it 
cost to supply 
electricity without 
attack and with the 
standard? 
 
Total cost or price of the energy (generated or purchased) exchanged 
in the scenario. Considering also cost associated to operations and 
maintenance in normal conditions.  
I 
Standard 
countermeasures 
Attack 
Yes 
Operative cost 
of power 
supply (it 
should be 
higher, the 
difference is 
the cost of the 
attack for the 
firm) 
How much does it 
cost to supply 
electricity with the 
attack and with the 
standard? 
 
Total cost (generation or purchase) of the electricity exchanged in 
the scenario.  
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J 
Standard 
countermeasures 
Attack 
Yes 
Cost of 
blackout 
Which region will 
be affected by the 
blackout? For how 
long? (It should be 
zero, or a smaller 
region, or for a 
shorter time) 
Characteristics of the 
customers not supplied? 
Same list as for item D 
K 
Standard 
countermeasures 
Attack 
Yes 
Increase in cost 
of security 
(emergency 
action) 
 
How much would it cost 
to run standard security 
countermeasures under 
attack? 
The expected increase in ordinary security costs is associated to 
costs associated with taking emergency action in response to attacks. 
(Recovery costs) 
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Table 2 describes the procedure that has to be adopted to assess the impact of standard on the whole system. 
The second and third columns indicate the two dimensions of comparison described in Table 1. Then, 
column 4 concerns the types of cost or effect to be considered. These encompass the cost of power 
(production, purchase and supply), the cost of running security countermeasures (with or without the 
standard, including also recovery costs), and the effects for the economy in case of blackout. These values 
have to be assessed for every specific case. In particular the actual level of countermeasures may differ a lot, 
as will be seen in case studies. A hypothetical, very unrealistic, situation in which no security 
countermeasure is implemented (which is referred in Table 4 as “no protection” case) would imply that 
current costs of security (item B) are zero. The cost of security includes both annual operative costs of 
management and maintenance, and the depreciation of investments. To highlight this, the operative cost of 
security with standards has been split into two items (F and G). 
The information on these costs in the case study comes from two different sources: a simulation showing 
what would happen in the electricity system in a particular situation (time, day of the year, location) with or 
without attack. This will return the real flows of electricity exchanged, the cost of power supply and, 
eventually, the impact of the blackout generated by the disturbance. This information has to be integrated 
with other information coming from different sources, concerning on the one hand the type of customers 
involved by the blackout, and on the other the technical and organisational cost of security.  
The assessment comes from the comparison between the different items that have to be calculated.  
TABLE 3: RELEVANT INDICATORS FOR THE IMPACT EVALUATION 
Calculation Content Notes 
I + J + K 
What happens in case of attack when 
adopting a standard 
They include the socioeconomic effect of the 
blackout, the cost of supplying electricity - if 
the blackout is not total - and the recovery 
costs (the costs associated with the actions 
necessary to restore the normal situation). 
C + D + E 
What happens in case of attack without the 
standard 
(I + J + K) – 
(C + D + E) 
BENEFIT (in terms of avoidable cost) 
The expected sign is minus (reduction in 
costs and negative effects, thanks to 
standard compliance). 
F + G Cost of security with the standard They include both annual costs and 
depreciation of investments. “A” could 
hypothetically be zero in the “no protection” 
theoretical case. 
A Cost of security without the standard 
H - B 
Increase in the cost of electricity supply with 
the standard 
It could be positive in case extra reserve 
capacity or more strict operative conditions 
are requested. 
(F + G + H) 
- (A + B) 
COST of standard compliance The expected sign is plus. 
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2. EVALUATION METHOD 
In the present section, the methodology for the Essence evaluation is lightly and clearly defined. Both, a high 
level quality and quantity assessment of case studies carried out during the project and a description of the 
subsequent cost and benefit analyses are included on the section. 
 
On the subject of the trial evaluations overview, the following subsections response a set of questions raised 
in the following bullets: 
 
 Which kinds of attack are considered in the case studies of Essence project? Where are they? When? 
What infrastructure?  
 What are consequences of the happened event? Which are the direct effects on the infrastructure? How 
do they affect to their dependent activities? 
  What are the countermeasures are necessary to block the attacks of the case studies? In which way 
are the implementations of the standards able to be used as a countermeasure to enhance the security 
of the infrastructures?  
 What is the way to estimate how much the implement these countermeasures costs? 
 How has it been evaluated the benefit of standard implementation? 
 
2.1 Trial evaluations  
In this chapter, the methodology used to evaluate the case studies (Poland and Italy) will be described. 
Diverse aspects of the case studies will be examined, to provide a broad view on them. 
2.1.1 Kind of attack studied 
Case studies have been proposed for two countries: Poland and Italy. In both cases, a particular, but 
representative case has been studied.  
 Italy: An attack on a power generation plant in a specific region, while the electric cable which 
connects a specific region and the mainland is being maintained. The case is considered to be quite 
likely. The attack is supposed to happen at 10 am of the third Wednesday of September, lasting for 6 
hours. The attack scenario is focused on the effect of a concrete plant.  
 Poland: in a specific region around a big city depends on three substations to receive electricity. An 
attack on these three substations can lead to a total blackout in the city. No particular scenario has 
been studied, but effects of a total blackout in the city have been reviewed.  
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2.1.2 Consequences of the attack 
To estimate consequences of attacks, the load profiles of Italy and Poland have been gathered to the 
electricity needs during the attack. Consumption has been divided into sectors to estimate economic effects.  
Firstly, the total electricity consumption in the studied day has been calculated. Then, this consumption has 
been divided into different economic sectors (industry, agriculture, households, etc.).  
Using these data, estimations of the load profile in a normal day similar to the studied day have been carried 
out. That way, the electricity that consumers would have used if they had not had their supply cut can be 
estimated. This has been done for different time periods and sectors.  
The amount of electricity that each sector cannot use can be calculated. Besides, a recovery path has been 
proposed, estimating how much electricity is available for use, in different periods while the problem is 
solved. The first sectors to receive electricity are considered. Then, the effect of the lack of electricity has 
been evaluated. 
Apart from the reduction in consumption by different sectors, the socio-economic impact has been evaluated. 
In the case of Italy, the attack is supposed to happen at the third Wednesday of September. The blackout 
would begin at 10 am, and 6 hours would be needed to recover the supply. There is no power supply until 1 
hour and 15 minutes have passed.  
 
2.1.3 Which countermeasures are necessary to block the attacks.  
For both scenarios the potential countermeasures - based on standards - necessary to contrast the threats have 
been considered. Standards which have been taken into account include NERC, NIST and ISA, and have 
been described into high detail. These standards describe IT tool management procedures that can increase 
security of the power system.  
Finally, according to standards, a number of countermeasures which can be applied are proposed. 
Countermeasures are based, mainly, on the following topics: 
 Isolate security zones, to avoid the propagation of an attack between different parts of the system. 
 Hinder, or make difficult the access to equipment by attackers: protect physically equipment, use of 
strong passwords, keep updated authorised users, etc. 
 Use the system only for what it has been created: do not install unauthorized software, and do not use 
the Internet for unintended objectives. 
 Restrict connection to portable computers, USB memory flicks, CDs, DVDs, etc.  
 Ongoing monitoring of the system and use of antivirus software.  
 Create plans for incident response, and keep these plans updated.  
 Use of “demilitarized zones” and anti-DoS devices.  
2.1.4 How much does it cost to implement these countermeasures? 
Finally, the cost of implementing the countermeasures has been considered. To do so, it has been necessary 
to estimate the number of countermeasures and time to implement them. Cost for equipment (ICS Systems, 
backup systems, etc.) has been taken into account. Finally, the number of professionals needed to implement 
Rapporto Tecnico, Anno 9, n° 57, Dicembre 2014                                                                                     
 
 
 
                                           17                                                                     
measures, along with cost per hour and number of hours needed to implement each countermeasure has been 
considered. 
Finally, the total cost of implementing each measure in each considered facility is estimated. Along with this, 
cost of maintaining measures is calculated. As a result, the total cost of implementing the countermeasures 
can be estimated.  
2.2 The cost analysis 
The costs calculated for the countermeasures selected in the two case studies are direct input of the cost 
analysis. This is particularly true in the case of the Polish case, which concerns a transmission system 
operator. Due to the interconnection of the grid it manages, any other solution than a whole country 
protection would not be acceptable. So the cost estimated in the case study already represents the cost for a 
country-wide protection of the grid. Moreover, since a part of the costs are fixed, but another part is linked to 
the number of substations present in the system, the data collected are a good basis to assess the scalability of 
the investment required.  
The estimation of the investment and of the maintenance costs for a country is less linear in the case of 
generation. The presence of multiple operators acting as competitors does not allow to have detailed 
information on the operating situation of each plant and on the actual protection level. The Italian case study 
considered the costs connected to standard compliance for the whole firm included in the case study (ENEL). 
In particular governance costs cover the protection of the whole group, since procedures must be uniform in 
the whole company to ensure protection, while only the cost concerning the protection of Enel plants located 
in Italy is included.  
These data concerning the Enel case-study have then been the basis for an estimate of the cost for the 
protection of the whole Italian generation system. Since this depends on the hypothesis on the operating 
conditions of the main generation plants, the country-scale estimate is expressed as a range. Furthermore, no 
serious scalability considerations could be done, because the costs strongly rely on the characteristic of the 
generation park, which varies a lot among European countries.  
A complete picture for a protection at the whole country level would require also to consider the importance 
of protecting the greatest distribution networks. Essence project didn’t include a case study on this, so an 
extension in analysis would be highly recommended. 
2.3 The benefit analysis 
Although cyber-attacks may cause many disturbances to the electricity system, the project concentrated on 
the most invasive consequence, black-outs, which can induce serious inconveniences to all kind of users: 
electricity firms, other firms and households. This damage occurs at multiple levels. Each level has to be 
investigated with appropriate techniques and represents the benefit of standard implementation, in the sense 
that it is an avoided cost for the economy. 
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2.3.1 The damage for firms 
Blackouts may cause direct losses (damage to equipment and to raw materials) and indirect damage (stop in 
production) to firms. Qualitative interviews showed that: 
- The ratio of indirect damage is in general much higher than the one of direct damages to plants 
- The value of this last is often not negligible, but varies a lot, even within the same industry, following 
the plant characteristics. So, no macro, aggregate estimate is possible. The case studies offered some 
qualitative evidence on the nature and characteristics of this damage. 
The basis for the calculation of the indirect damage is the quantity of electricity not sold in case of black-out. 
This has been obtained as an output of the case-studies. One must then assess how great is the economic 
damage deriving from the supply interruption. Here again some differences exist. First of all, for the 
electricity operators, it is necessary to estimate the lost revenue at all the levels of the service (generation, 
transmission, distribution, sale), considering the added value and the correct tariffs at that time (day and 
hour). For what the other industries are concerned, to pass from the quantity of electricity not delivered to te 
economic damage, the VOLL (Value of the Lost Load) has been applied. It is a ratio, calculated from macro-
economic statistics, comparing the value added registered in a certain time frame and in a specific area and 
the electricity consumed in the same context. The estimate will be more precise the more these ratios are 
calculated for specific industries, but the level of specificity is bounded by the availability of detailed data 
for the required industry and geographical area. The greater is the area of the blackout, the more detailed 
industry data will be available. Moreover, some detail will be lost when combining the taxonomy of 
industries applied by the national statistical office, and the one used for electricity statistics. These may be 
different and so it will be necessary to aggregate some industries, to reach a common classification. In the 
benefit analysis the maximum possible level of detail has been applied to each situation, considering 
available data. 
Finally, in the case of firms, it must be considered that the electricity dependence is uneven among sectors: 
some kinds of activities can be carried on even in absence of electricity. Their weight largely depends on the 
type of production. Some scenarios taking into account this limited energy dependence have been estimated 
too. 
2.3.2 The damage for private users and for the society 
As for non-economic electricity users, there are many sources of damages linked to a black-out: 
- Individual material damage (for example food spoilage) 
- Individual immaterial damage (impossibility to practice the planned activities, anxiety to be blocked in 
unpleasant situations, the necessity to spend time to restart programmed domestic appliances) 
- Collective damage (impossibility to supply essential services, increased criminality)  
The third assessment requires several specific inquiries, which go out the scope of the Essence project, so the 
assessment connected to the case study was restricted to the first two types of damage and was based on a 
survey.  
After a careful evaluation of the available methodological alternatives, the questionnaire was based on the 
concept of “Willingness to Accept”, i.e the willingness to be compensated for a blackout by a stated amount 
of money. In particular, after some questions aimed at obtaining some variables on the characteristics of the 
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users and also to increase their awareness on the importance of electricity in their life, the participants to the 
survey were asked to choose to accept or to refuse a set of different scenarios, represented by different black-
out duration and discount value combinations. About 500 questionnaires in Italy and 120 in Poland were 
collected, which is a quite large number, if one considers that any respondent returned 7 observations 
(assessed scenarios), large enough to run the following econometric estimates. Anyway the reliability and 
precision of the benefit estimate would increase by adopting more sophisticated sampling techniques. 
Finally, to obtain the value of the damage caused by the interruption it is then necessary to use these data as 
an input for a model, where the probability of choosing a given blackout scenario (and therefore the 
associated utility for the respondent) is a function of the blackout characteristics, of the respondent and 
household characteristics and of the country of residence. The estimated parameters can be used to predict 
the value of the utility lost with the interruption. 
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3. DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDIES  
In this section a picture of the case studies is done including a summary of the most important and public 
information of them, elaborated in “Deliverable 4: Italian Case Study” and “Deliverable 5: Polish Case 
Study” of Essence project. This description contains a short explanation of the scenarios studied, a 
general overview of the situations in terms of power system numbers and narrative of the potential events, 
and the countermeasures applied for each case. A set of common characteristics will be listed in the 
introductory part of the section before entering in this description. 
The Essence project targeted the global assessment in the analysis for the cost effective implementation of 
emerging standards in the control systems of a very special infrastructure, the power network. The level of 
automation on this infrastructure is considered very high due not only to the physical properties of the 
electricity but also to the necessities of the electric market and the linked business. The electricity supply 
(considering the whole power value chain) and this business support many economy sectors contributing 
significantly to the gross domestic product in all developed countries.  
The implemented cases draw a number of parallel scenarios including a certain number of common 
characteristics. In the analysis, for both cases, how the implementation of different measures could 
impact in costs has been compared with the calculation of the consequences derived from the 
alternative impact of having a blackout in the power network considered. 
As it is commented in section 2.1.1, the two case studies conducted the analysis in different type of facilities, 
with different ITC systems to control it; however, they have in common the analysis of more than one 
attack scenario as it will be explained during the present section: two for the generation facility in Italy, and 
three different kind of attacks to access substations with several consequences depending on the level of the 
intrusion in the communication and control systems. This point would allow future assessments to include 
multiple evaluations in the implementation of measures. This multiple evaluations in the implementation of 
measures means that the future assessments could be performed considering two different approaches. On 
the one hand considering the implementation of a standard or part of a standard (countermeasure with 
specific cost) could prevent against one or various threats (different events to face), and on the other hand 
that the implementation of several actions (countermeasures) could be overlapped to prevent a single threat 
(one type of event). 
The goodness of the power network functioning could be measured using different performance indicators 
such as Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), percentage of capacity used in a circuit or the non-
served energy. In both case studies the targeted indicator to estimate the cost of the impact in case that 
an attack would have success is the non-served energy. This meter let the analyst to cross-match the direct 
effect on the power network and macro-economic data to estimate this impact. 
The area involved in both cases is regionally wide-ranging. The extension reached by the potential threat 
encompassed in the case studies would affect to more than one million of people (in each case) and there 
would be direct impact in the daily economic activities of industry and service sectors in a large scale. This 
point supports the usage of macroeconomic information for industrial and services activities and macro 
social figures for households developed in other similar studies. 
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Summarizing, the mutual features of the two case studies are: 
+ The method for calculating the impact derived from the implementation of common 
standards. 
+ The analysis of more than one attack scenario. 
+ The selection of a common performance indicator to estimate the cost of the impact in case 
that an attack would have success is the non-served energy. 
+ The size of the area involved. 
3.1 Italian case study  
3.1.1 Studied scenarios 
In the case of Italy, two possible scenarios have been considered: 
 An attack using a malware able to replicate itself on the infected network. The malware would affect 
randomly processes running on the operative system, making impossible to control operations in 
course. It would be impossible to receive or delivery commands or malware would modify the 
behaviour of components of the SCADA system. Attacks can be produced after the connection of a 
mass storage device (such as an USB pen-drive or optical disk), or by opening an infected 
attachment received by a trusted email.  
 An attack aimed at saturating the network traffic, hindering data exchange between field and 
operators. This way, controllers would be shown old information which cannot be updated, and so 
they would lose control of installations. It can be produced by using the packet amplification attack, 
such as a smurf attack or a fraggle attack. Smurf attacks produce a big amount of ICMP Echo 
Requests traffic to a broadcast address, with each ICMP Echo packet containing the address of the 
victim. When the packet of requests arrives at the destination network, all hosts on the network send 
requests to the spoofed address, multiplying the number of requests received by the victim. This 
makes the victim system become unavailable.  
Both attacks would make big effects on the network, but effects as well as duration of the recovery processes 
would be different.  
In case that malicious software affect one or more computers of the control system, it is possible that the 
attack is propagated to the network, generating a DoS on the network, making it collapse. 
On the other hand, an attack which could saturate the network traffic would make this system unavailable for 
users. Operators would suffer important delays in the reception of updated data, with digital readings totally 
frozen. Thus, it would be impossible to monitor plants, or ensure its correct operation. If the situation is 
recognized to be critical, the emergency procedures can be started, and the operator should push the 
emergency stop push-button. Besides, these plants have automatic safety mechanisms able to automatically 
stop them. This system is known as the Emergency Shut Down system or ESD system.  
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The intervention methodology varies depending on which of both attacks are being produced.  
Regarding malware attacks, the first action should be to disconnect all computers from the network to avoid 
infection of other computers connected to it. Then, all computers should be scanned to detect malware in 
execution, to stop and remove it from the system. Finally, once all computers have been cleaned, they should 
be reconnected, one by one to the network, making sure the infection is not produced again.  
If an antivirus is already installed on the computer, and it is able to remove the infection from each 
computer, the infection could be eliminated in few hours (4-8 hours). On the contrary, if the antivirus is 
unable to solve the problem, then the time to make the system functional would depend on the number of 
affected computers, but it can be estimated to be about a few days.  
Regarding the DoS scenario, the attack would affect only few computers, and then they can be isolated and 
tested to detect abnormal behaviour. Time to re-establish communication can be estimated to be about 6 
hours.  
Additionally, plants which have been stopped cannot be put into operation immediately, because it is 
necessary to warm them up before restart. Time to restart plants will vary between 1 and 6 hours in the case 
of a malware attack and 1-2 hours in the case of a DoS attack. Thus, total recovery time for both studied 
scenarios would vary between 12-56 hours regarding the malware attack, and 6-10 hours in the example of a 
DoS. 
 
3.1.2 Case study 
If power generation is not immediately recovered, load shedding procedures would be applied to balance the 
unavailable power. These procedures create a priority list, i.e. a list ordering power consumers according to 
their needs for electricity, and the effect of a cut of supply: pumping water, large industries (some of them 
can be subjected to load shedding), small and medium industries and households. If the power is not 
restored, blackouts take place.  
Finally, the selected Scenario to study has been the one that makes the biggest effect: a complete blackout. 
The attack is supposed to happen at mid-morning of a working Wednesday, when the total load on the region 
grid is about 3.000 MW. After the blackout, two generation plants are started to restore voltage and 
frequency. In 1 to 3 hours, other plants can be recovered. After 3 hours, the power is recovered, along with 
the link between the island and mainland (but no power is exchanged). Then the production units are 
synchronised with the mainland, making it possible to exchange power.  
To evaluate the socio-economic impact of the cyber-attack on the region, the daily load profiles in the region 
in a normal day and in the case of a blackout have been compared. In the day chosen to carry out the study 
by hypothesis it takes place the maintenance of the connection cable between this region and the rest of the 
system. The attack is supposed to take place at 10:00 am.  
The load profile of the chosen day, detailed to the quarter of an hour was obtained by recorded statistics. 
Power consumption, per quarter of hour, for all sectors has been obtained. Then, the estimation of the 
amount of electricity used by each economic sector has been carried out, taking into account yearly 
consumption for these sectors.  
For the case of the attack, the hourly load profile for all sectors has been estimated. To do this, the amount of 
power available for use, has been considered. In the first 15 minutes, there is no power available. Electricity 
recovered is used by the major cities. After 1 hour and 15 minutes, there are 120 MW available to use by 
these cities. After 3 hours and 15 minutes, there are 600 MW, used by residential and services sectors in 
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these cities. Considering that by then the connection with mainland will have been restored, it can be 
assumed that, after 3 hours and 30 minutes, some industrial activities can use electricity. Finally, after 6 
hours, the electricity supply is totally restored.  
3.1.3 Countermeasures 
Countermeasures should ensure that the plant can stand a cyber-attack and that the supply is ensured. They 
are focused specially on ICT components, which are used to ensure monitoring and control, and depend on 
some characteristics of the installed system.  
Some countermeasures to ensure that communication using both wired and wireless links are secure are: 
 Strict configuration of network access points; 
 Use of dedicated, cabled links for safety-related functions; 
 If applicable, setup of IDS/IPS to detect attacks and for alarming via alternative channels; 
 Redundant connection of components, using different protocols or communication routes. 
 
Security architecture is based on the segmentation of the Control System Network, dividing the system into 
security zones and creating layers of protection which isolate the most critical parts of the system. Access to 
security layers must begin in the least trusted and go to the most trusted, and connections must be 
implemented only between secure interconnections. Besides, all resources in a security zone must have the 
same minimum level of trust, and if not, additional security measures must be taken. 
In the case studied, the system must be divided into security zones, according to its functionality, its 
criticality and its physical location. All resources within a security zone must have a minimum level of 
security, and to achieve this, the following measures can be taken: 
 Each trusted zone should be kept small and independent, and be administered from the inside.  
 Physically protect all equipment. 
 Disable all unnecessary network connections, services, file share methods.  
 Ensure that all connections between a trusted network zone and other networks are secure.  
 Use strong passwords, and change them regularly, to ensure that only authorized users can log on to 
the system.  
 Update authorized users, user groups, and access rights, ensuring that they are according to the current 
responsibilities of all individuals and current authorities. 
 Do not use the system for e-mail, Internet browsing or other functions do not related to the main 
function.  
 Avoid installation of unauthorized software. 
 Use virus scanner on all system nodes.  
 Restrict or disable connection of portable computers, USB memory flicks and other removable data 
carriers.  
 If CDs, DVDs, USB memory sticks or other removable data carriers are used, they should be checked 
for viruses before using. 
 Monitor the system to detect intrusion attempts.  
 Use antivirus software, and keep it updated. 
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 Create plans for incident response, including recovery plans. 
 Currently and periodically review compliance of the organization, systems and installations with 
security policies, procedures and practices.  
 
 The main countermeasures to be adopted can be summarized as follow:  
 Deploying anti-(D)DoS devices and services; 
 Traffic filtering; 
 Utilising timely patch management; 
 Deploying anti-virus software; 
 Performing system hardening; 
 System & network segregation; 
 Use of “demilitarized zones” (DMZs); 
 Data warehousing in order to facilitate the secure transfer of data from the SCADA network to 
business networks; 
 Commissioning penetration testing and vulnerability assessments to third parties could provide an 
objective analysis of the level of security of a SCADA network. 
3.2  Polish case study  
3.2.1 Studied scenarios 
For the case of Poland, the case study considers a serious disturbance on the 3 substations owned by PSE 
Transmission Operator, which can lead to an outage in the a given area. Substations are very vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks, and risks of these attacks are high. 
Attacks can be produced when an attacker is able to access substations, using a malicious code, invalid 
commands or achieve to control ICT systems. Access can be achieved by: 
 Attacking local or remote ICT systems (using public access or the central SCADA system, which 
provides access to multiple objectives).  
 Independently attacking local ICT systems on many substations. 
 Attacking local ICT system on one substation, and then penetrating next substations or intermediary 
systems.  
Effects of attacks depend on the level of the intrusion: 
 Level 0- Intrusion affects a single device. This attack makes effects only on the part of the system 
affected. If the attacked device is not a component of control substation, the only consequence can 
be data theft.  
 Level 1- The attacker can drive a single system for a power system. This attack makes the same effects 
that a Level-0 attack. 
 Level 2- The attacker can communicate to most systems, but maximum effects will be no bigger than 
a Level-0 attack.  
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 Level 3- The attacker takes control of all electric power facilities, by attacking the central SCADA 
system.  
Attacks on level 0-2 makes smaller effects by themselves, however, they can provide access to other objects 
and final results can be similar to a level 3 attack.  
Some factors which can increase the likelihood of an attack are: 
 Use of devices from a single manufacturer for many power facilities. 
 Use of the same contractor, or the same group of contractors for servicing and maintenance. 
 Lack of security monitoring tools in substations, or unsecure communication tools.  
The first two vulnerabilities can be profited by external service providers, or attackers who have infected 
software used by contractors. External service providers can transfer infection to many objects, as they have 
to work with many of them.  
The third vulnerability can provide the attacker with access to central SCADA or to other power facilities.  
Besides, the three attacks can be carried out by a person who normally is allowed to access the system, such 
as disappointed employees.  
3.2.2 Simulation of attacks 
To simulate an attack and estimate its effect on the electric system, the following assumptions were adopted: 
 All communication levels between systems of TSO were studied, looking for vulnerabilities in 
different systems, which could be used as method of attack. 
 Attackers are supposed to have time enough and expertise to look for vulnerabilities, unless 
appropriate security measures are taken.  
 If communication between different systems or objects is discovered, attacks could be spread on other 
levels of the network.  
Besides, a list of countermeasures to detect and interrupt attacks was studied, taking into account: 
 Maturity of the EU and Polish law. 
 Reduction of the likelihood of a remote attack. 
 Reduction of the likelihood of a local attack. 
 Increase in the likelihood of detection of an attack in the reconnaissance phase. 
 Minimize duration of the incident.  
Detailed analysis of each of the proposed countermeasures has been carried out, to evaluate vulnerabilities of 
the system to each level of attack. As a result of the application of protective measures to the Polish Power 
System, as well as a number of countermeasures implemented in the Central SCADA system and business 
system, it can be concluded that only attackers with large funds and high knowledge could carry out this 
attack. A physical attack remains being more feasible and cheaper than a cyber-attack.  
To estimate effects of an attack on the Polish Power System, data on the electricity consumer groups in the 
area affected were collected. As a result of this, the gross domestic product generated by each sector has 
been estimated.  
Thus, effects of an electricity cut depends on the affected sector, the duration of the electricity cut, the period 
of the year and the moment of the day, as well as the type of day of the week (working day or weekend).  
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Effects can be divided into direct and indirect. Direct economic impact include the loss of production, 
spoilage of raw materials or food and equipment damage, while direct social impacts come from lack of 
electricity at home to lack of transportation. 
Indirect impacts include civil disobedience during a blackout, failure of industrial devices, etc.  
The studied electricity interruption took place in Warsaw, at 5 p.m., lasting for 6 hours and affecting a 
variety of customers.  
3.2.3 Use of standards and proposed countermeasures 
Countermeasures are chosen taking into account the N-1 criterion: failure of one single element of the 
transmission network should not disrupt the network. Thus, only the occurrence of a number of problems 
should disturb operation.  
Countermeasures should avoid the spread of the cyber-attack, minimizing its effect and duration.  
Three types of substations have been studied: 
 Substations in urban agglomerations. 
 Substations discharging power plants. 
 Substations of international trade.  
 
Failures in substations which discharge power plants can produce an important loss of power in the system, 
which cannot be compensated. Then, the National Power System would be divided into areas excluded from 
power.  
Regarding substations in international borders, this situation has been studied in the Polish-German border. 
A sudden shutdown of such a substation could cut electricity flow from the north to south Germany, 
threatening electricity stability of the German power system. To avoid these effects, it is necessary to design 
the system according to the N-1 criterion.  
Finally, failure effects have been studied. The area receives electricity only from these substations, so this 
failure would lead to a total blackout of the city. Countermeasures to take in order to avoid this attack should 
be focused on: 
 Hinder attack propagation, by means of diversification of service providers, use of heterogeneous 
devices in the transmission network, and ensuring security of the ITC systems (eliminating 
vulnerabilities, creating firewalls). 
 Increase probability of attack detection: construction of intersystem communication nodes and inter-
control points, honey pot traps and automatic analysis and correlation of events. 
 Minimize duration of failures.  
 
These assumptions can reduce the number of potential cyber attackers to only those with bigger knowledge, 
budget and time. Only these attackers could break the system without being detected, as if they made 
mistakes, the monitoring system could detect them. Thus, attackers could choose other methods, like 
physical attacks.  
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3.3 Open issues and future directions of research 
The power sector and the facilities included on its network are under a complicated framework for its 
operation. A lot of relevant factors, such as the continuous technological improvements (at different layers 
in which information and communication technologies are one of these layers) linked to the necessity to 
maintain the operation of old facilities and to establish the coexistence of different levels of 
performance in the network, or special regulatory conditions, or the inevitability quality of safety and -
what is really important in the Essence approach - “different levels of security for facilities and equipment 
which subsist in a common infrastructure”, accentuate this challenging work.  
In addition to this fact, the current activity in industrial sectors is more dependent from electricity than 
households or service sectors. Even if the rational sense invite to think about the similar dependency in the 
service sector than in the industrial one, the energy intensity on the first one and the chance to continue 
operating many activities during a blackout is higher and derived from this. There are also strong and 
more differentiated evidences on direct damages resulting from blackouts to industrial processes.  
For example, many manufacturing chains have to stop during a blackout, or, uninterruptible power supply 
(UPS) systems support longer for service sector activities than industrials. In industrial activities, sometimes 
instead of an UPS, the companies provide factories and manufacturing chains with alternative power supply 
facilities in order to avoid potential blackouts. A detailed description and use of electricity could be checked 
in chapter 3 (description and use of electricity) in a deliverable of SESAME project
i
. On this research 
document, there are a list of tables estimating the qualitative impact of a blackout by type of consumer and 
sectors. More over some qualitative evidence has also been obtained through some case studies in Essence 
ii
  
The whole value chain of energy supply and its working operation failures produce events and disruptions in 
the energy supply. The work done in the case studies could be used again for new analysis in different ways. 
Two main categories of possible extensions could be considered:  
 Use the results of the Essence project as road map to do similar evaluations in other electricity 
services or in other critical infrastructures. For example an important group of facilities whose 
protection should still be assessed concerns the distribution of electricity. In particular, in this field, 
the topic of the security of ‘Smart-grids’ is attracting a lot of interest, due to the complexity of their 
operation. The Smart-grids’ is the name of the “digital two-way communications between 
consumers, or even in some cases ‘prosumers’6 of electricity’ and electric power companies sector”. 
In accordance with many recent publications, there are a list of existing threats for the electricity 
supply infrastructure as consequence of the development of the new ‘Smart-grids’. One of these 
threats is the loss of energy derived from a potential blackout generated by hackers.  
In an ENISA7’s reportiii on threats in the area of smart grids and good practice guide - Smart-grid 
Threat Landscape and Good Practice Guide - is stated that an important threat could be connected to 
the “Manipulation of information” and that it could have an impact on power supply: “….False data 
are injected by an attacker in the smart grid traffic. The attacker injects false or malicious DR 
events in DRAS (Demand Response Automation Server), causing blackouts and instability of the 
grid….”.This is not the only one threat. In Figure 1 there is a picture with the list of all identified 
threats for a Smart grid infrastructure. 
                                                     
6 Agent in the electricity market which generates (produces) and consumes electricity  
7 European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
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The implementation of the emerging standards, coincident in many cases with the ones used in the 
Essence case studies, could help to enhance the protection of the whole infrastructure against these 
existing threats. In the same report published by ENISA, a set of standards as the ones published by 
NIST or IEEE, are presented as a solution for mitigating the likelihood of the threats. So that, the use 
of Essence methodology could be considered for similar case studies in the Smart-grid infrastructure. 
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Source: elaboration based on smart grid threat landscape and good practice guide, enisa 
FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW OF THREATS ASSUMED FOR SMART GRID ASSETS. 
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 The interest in Essence results derives from the absence, as far as we know, of other similar studies, but 
their reliability and generality could be improved by be to making deeper analysis: in more detail, 
more extention or in other regions, using partially or as a whole the Essence results process to 
elaborate them. Here is a list of possible examples. 
One example of these deeper analysis could be done by studying the behavior of the response in the 
energy consumption as well as its impact in the one of the economies included in the case studies. In 
case project results could be updated and improved by more precise estimates of this impact in 
the regions, being in a position to better calculate this impact (above all for households, using 
representative stochastic samples, for example) than in the case studies done.  
Other examples of suggested future work could be to use the methodology used in Essence project 
and the results regarding the socioeconomic impact and benefit analysis (households, industry and 
services) for evaluating different threats which could produce comparable impacts in the power 
network although they do not concern the cyber-protection. These attacks are not in the scope of 
the project, nevertheless they could produce similar generalized black-outs and so the same cost-
benefit methodology could be applied. Other types of threats include human physical threats, 
accidental threats or natural threats. A more detailed list can be found in the work developed in the 
deliverable “D1.1 Analysis of historic outages”iv of SESAME project, publicly available on 
https://www.sesame-project.eu/publications/deliverables/d1-1-report-on-the-analysis-of-historic-
outages/view. Moreover, the implementation of security standards produces a list of 
countermeasures to protect the power facilities against different threats. There would be the 
possibility to use Essence methodology and results for the evaluation of other countermeasures to 
enhance power network security. There is a more detailed list of countermeasures to protect the 
power facilities in the work developed in the deliverable “D1.4 Incident-response system”v of 
SESAME project, public available on SESAME website https://www.sesame-
project.eu/publications.  
Other possible improvements in the impact evaluation include the enlargement of the geographical 
dimension. This does not only imply to do the same analysis considering additional events for a 
larger region, but also to build probabilistic samples of private users in different regions, so as to 
guarantee a certain level of statistical representativeness.  
The already mentioned continuous technological improvements in the Electricity and ITC sectors 
(both linked to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) of electricity systems) requires to infrastructure 
managers to keep on being in the state-of-the-art regarding security issues in these sectors and 
subsectors. These security issues directly linked to power supply, electricity infrastructures safety or 
regulation frameworks and standardization, are continuously changing and progressing. These 
evolutions create the inevitability caution to not forget that Essence research activities have been 
developed in a particular context, with specific hypothesis, so the future analysis should have to take 
into account these factors, and test the possibility to transfer the strong results emerging from the 
case studies and discussed in the following section, to other contexts. 
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Summarizing, the OPEN ISSUES and future directions of research beyond Essence project activities 
and results are: 
+ Use these results in a similar case study of other part of the value chain of the energy 
infrastructure or other critical infrastructures  
+ Elaborate deeper analysis in different ways: 
o Updating and improving the project results and producing a more precise cost 
benefit evaluation. 
o Evaluating different threats which could produce comparable impacts in the power 
network. 
o Evaluating other countermeasures to enhance power network security. 
o Doing the same analysis considering additional events for a larger region and 
representative samples of end users. 
+ Remain innovative in the sectors and subsectors related to Essence research activities: Power 
supply, Electricity infrastructures safety, ITC Security, regulation frameworks and 
standardization, etc.  
3.4 Summary of trial evaluations: good practices 
Since the statement of good practices in the revision in oneself work (Essence consortium defining good 
practices of the work done) is a rather difficult task, the first step in the sake of objective evaluation, is to 
gather some information from reputed works in similar or comparable approaches. 
The main issue to remark is the establishment of an appropriate framework, data collection and execution of 
the realistic cases for elaborating an accurate cost-benefit evaluation. Considering that the implementation of 
emerging standards aims at enhancing security levels in the power infrastructure, it is important to have in 
mind that benefit of a security measure is a function of three elements: 
 The probability of a successful attack on the targeted infrastructure(s). 
 The losses sustained in the successful attack. 
 The reduction in risk when the measure is applied. 
Due to the particular characteristics of the attacks, the probability of a successful attack on the targeted 
infrastructure has not been included in the analysis of the project. The Directive on attacks against 
Information Systems, which was adopted by the European Council on 22 July 2013, combats cyber-attacks 
against information systems and includes the creation of a data base repository of cyber-attacks by sector. 
Despite this, during the project activities, and in particular at the early stages of the project, when the 
activities were scheduled, the Essence team did not identify public information available. The availability of 
Rapporto Tecnico, Anno 9, n° 57, Dicembre 2014                                                                                     
 
 
 
                                           31                                                                     
this kind of information on cyber-attacks, in particular for the power sector and its infrastructures, could 
improve the risk analysis, and allow to consider the different probability of the various threats. 
A really good practice carried out during the Essence project was the calculation of the losses sustained in 
the successful attack for both cases. This quantification for the cases has been made using a comparable 
scheme with similar characteristics as area affected or timeframe. The results of losses estimations are 
comparable and could be considered for contrasting with other evaluations. 
The utilization of security standards for power controls has not been completely drawn on in a prototype 
built during the project. The security standards were used considering previous principles postulated and 
observed and a technology formulation was postulated, and this means that some applications have been 
formulated 8. There is the assumption that the implementation of the measures would increase security 
levels and reduce inherent risk is. The establishment of metrics for the estimation or risk reduction would 
improve the qualitative results of the case studies. 
A set of good practices for a similar analysis could be found in different specialized bibliography. Some of 
the reference reports at international level are the “Financial Management Reference” series published by the 
Department of Finance and Administration of the Australian Government. Under this series two particular 
publications about the targeted activity can be found: “Introduction to Cost-Benefit Analysis and Alternative 
Evaluation Methodologies”vi and “Handbook of Cost-Benefit Analysis”vii. These publications provide 
guidance in the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for evaluation and decision-making.  
This guidance, apart from describing the analysis process, includes the welfares of its application, a set of 
good practices and possible barriers to proceed with a CBA and some existing alternatives such as the 
elaboration of a “financial evaluation” or the execution of a “cost-effectiveness analysis”. Summarizing the 
main rules to proceed with a case, it is important to consider the efficiency allocation of resources and the 
performance of the actions in the process, the estimation of the opportunity cost, the identification of 
compensations among different actors (to face the problem of costs and benefits not incurred by the 
same agents) and the establishment of an adequate cost benefit rule. A little further ahead there will be 
some comments on this. 
The efficiency allocation of security investments is linked to the performance of power infrastructure in the 
provision of an effective energy supply (in this case electricity) to the customers. In the cases of Essence 
                                                     
8 This could be a complete classification of innovation process steps: 
1) Idea. Unproven concept, no testing has been performed 
2) Basic research. Principles postulated and observed but no experimental proof available.  
3) Technology formulation. Concept and application have been formulated 
4) Applied research. First laboratory tests completed; proof of concept  
5) Small scale prototype built in a lab environment (“ugly prototype) 
6) Large scale prototype tested in intended environment 
7) Prototype system tested in intended environment close to expected performance 
8) Demonstration system operating in operational environment at pre-commercial scale 
9) First commercial industrialisation. Manufacturing issues solved 
10) Full commercial application, technology available for consumers 
ESSENCE works has been on steps 2-3. A complete proof of concept would require to go to step  4. 
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project, the established situations in attack scenarios (latent and realistic scenarios) are threats that would 
not only imply the affection of the power infrastructure and the operation companies, but the disturbing of 
the electricity market would also affect household and industrial sectors.  
The opportunity cost of the unsupplied energy in the cases in Essence project involves energy customers, 
however the cost of implementing the emerging standards for the facilities is always supposed to be 
supported by the company owner of the facility affected. The impact of the cost of implementing measures 
directly upsets the utility in the Italian case study and the power network manager for the Polish one. In a 
CBA it is important to compare costs and benefits, but for the scope of Essence, and of the regulator as well, 
it is also essential to identify which actors support costs and which ones receive benefits.  
One missing point in the scope of the project the establishment of a set of rules to apply an adequate 
cost benefit analysis. The results show that there is a cost associated to the threat in the hypothesis of 
success of the attack to the different facilities, which faces the cost to improve the security on them. For 
example, the elaboration of an analysis like in the paper “Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of 
Homeland Security”viii elaborated by Homeland Security Affairs of U.S.A. provided more accurate results 
through the benefit generated by enhanced security measures if they have been able to prevent or protect 
against an otherwise successful attack for a range of losses from a successful attack and for a range of annual 
attack probabilities. 
Another key reference, specific for the purpose of establishing an evaluation criterion of Essence work, is the 
“Methodology for Conducing Cost Benefit Analysis To Support Energy Security Investments”ix prepared by 
the, Department of Systems Engineering United States Military Academy in January of 2013. In this report it 
was explained the method to conduct an evaluation case of the implementation of measures to improve 
the resilience of energy supply in a Military environment. In accordance with this method, the evaluation 
needs to include eight different most important steps: 
1. Define the problem / opportunity to include background and circumstances, 
2. Define the scope and formulate facts and assumptions, 
3. Define and document alternatives (including the status quo if relevant), 
4. Develop cost estimates for each alternative (including status quo if relevant), 
5. Identify quantifiable and difficult to quantify benefits, 
6. Define alternative selection criteria, 
7. Compare alternatives, and 
8. Report results and recommendations. 
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COSTS
 The total of quantifiable and 
non-quantifiable costs
 Quantifiable costs
Direct
Indirect
Initial/Start up
Sustainment
Procurement
Salary and Benefits
 Non Quantifiable costs
Life/Safety/Health
Perception/Image
Opportunity
Risk/Uncertainty
Political
BENEFITS
 The total of quantifiable and 
non-quantifiable benefits
 Quantifiable benefits
Cost savings and 
avoidances
Increased productivity
Reduced processing time
Reduced error rates
Increase in capacity
 Non Quantifiable benefits
Better information for 
decision making
Easier to use or access
Increase in choice or 
options
Reduced redundancy
Achievement of 
organizational 
goals/objectives
8. Report Results and Recommendations
7. Compare Alternatives
6. Define alternative Selection Criteria
5. Identify Quantifiable and Non-Quantifiable 
Benefits
4. Develop Cost Estimate for Each Alternative
3. Define Alternatives
2. Define the Scope; Formulate Facts and 
Assumptions
1. Define the problem/ Opportunity; Describe 
the background
BENEFITS MUST BALANCE OR OUTWEIGH COSTS AND REQUIRED TRAD-OFFS
 
FIGURE 2: THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS PROCESS ACCORDING TO DEPARTMENT  
OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING UNITED STATES 
 
 
Among others, the work carried out during the project and the subsequent results contributed to evaluate 
costs and benefits of the implementation of ICT emerging standards as security measures in the field of 
energy to improve more reliable supply and provide a number of conceivable regulatory options. These cases 
could be used to exemplify (not justify by alone) actions such as raising the levy on the use of electricity or 
implementing changes in the regulation of electricity networks. The key question dealt with in these cases is 
whether and how investors responsible and policy makers should be involved in taking measures regarding 
security of energy supply. 
The option standards implementation in different facilities for the electric infrastructure, to increase the 
security of electricity supply comprises several types of governmental action, including subsidies, regulation 
and government investments. From an economic point of view, therefore, it would be often wiser to accept 
consequences of supply disruptions than to pursue security of supply at any cost. This implies that players 
involved in the power sector investments should exercise caution in imposing measures regarding security of 
supply. 
In addition to the ones described in the present section, any of the open issues and future ways for continuing 
the Essence project works, addressed in the section “3.3 Open issues and future directions of research”, 
applied to incoming works could be considered as “best practices” for future case studies. Many of the points 
raised on that section would provide better sample reliability or wider analysis of indirect costs. The 
enlargement of the case studies to a European view could be a driver to obtain a generalization of the results.  
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Some of the good (and ‘not good’) practices identified during Essence project activities could be 
summarized as follow:  
̶ The probability of a successful attack on the targeted infrastructure has not been included in the 
analysis so, to improve the project results it would be interesting to collect cyber-attacks 
information for power sector and its infrastructures to estimate their likelihood. 
+ The damages caused by blackouts in the case studies are comparable and could be considered for 
comparison with other evaluations. 
̶ The improvement of resilience levels in the facilities with utilization of security standards for 
power controls has not been completely contrasted during the project with the implementation 
of a prototype. There is the assumption that the implementation of the measures would 
increase security levels and the reduction in risk is inherent. 
+ Despite there is no explicit implementation of security standards utilization, Essence project 
adopted latent and realistic scenarios. 
+ The identification of the actors who will incur in costs and enjoy the benefits of the investments, 
which is a consequence of Essence results, provides added value to the work. 
̶ The enlargement of the case studies to a European view could be a driver to obtain a 
generalization of the results. 
4. CONCLUSIONS OF THE EVALUATION (SUMMARY OF FINDINGS) 
4.1 Key findings from the case studies 
4.1.1 Vulnerabilities and countermeasures 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) of electricity systems show important vulnerabilities, which have to be 
analysed on a case by case base, because they may differ a lot not only with reference to the specialization of 
the firm (TSO, DSO or generation) but also to the peculiar situation of any plant (connections, geographical 
features, state of the infrastructure, etc.).  
These vulnerabilities can be exploited by attacks that may lead to sudden shutdown of some power 
generation plants and substations of the transmission grid. In most cases the system is resilient and can 
manage the situation without any external help but, in special cases the effect may be more disruptive. In 
both Essence case-studies a situation was detected where an attack could lead to a blackout lasting six hours, 
although with different recovery profiles. Hence there are situations (for example. multiple attacks, or attacks 
to special places and/or when the transmission grid is somewhat ‘weak’) in which these attacks may lead to 
significant blackouts that may involve millions inhabitants, inhibit large shares of productive activities and 
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last several hours. This underlines the importance of guaranteeing the security of all relevant nodes and not 
only the interconnection grid. 
Countermeasures exist that can reduce the probability of success of such attacks (or, in other words, raise the 
cost of a successful attack), although they do not eliminate completely the risk. The defensive strategy must 
take into account different needs, implementing and maintaining countermeasures to minimize remote 
attacks; to minimize the effects of a local attack, to prevent the propagation and escalation of an attack and, 
finally to shorten the duration of the effects of a cyber-attack. Acting on all four levels will guarantee the 
maximum effectiveness (highest level of protection) and at the same time will improve efficiency, since 
scale economies are possible and so the global investment required is lower. 
These countermeasures may be retrieved in more than one standard, so it may be said that all standards 
address in a way or in another the main threats. Nevertheless the choice between standards is not so 
straightforward, since there is not perfect congruence between standards, and because standards that seem 
more adequate for GenCos are not the same that fit TSOs. Since recertification is very expensive, a clear 
European regulation or agreed guidelines are of the upmost importance. 
4.1.2 Costs and benefits of standard implementation 
The project identified the key organizational and technical countermeasures needed to increase the security 
level of the involved infrastructures so as to neutralize or mitigate possible attacks.  
Results quantify the cash flows for the implementation (investment costs) and maintenance (annual 
operational costs) of the security standards. In both cases two situations have been considered: costs that 
should be borne if no security standards had been implemented yet (no protection case) and costs that should 
be borne starting from the current situation in order to manage a higher supplementary security (delta cost). 
In the Italian case study, based on a generation company, a further passage has been necessary: the costs 
needed to implement the chosen countermeasures in the firm have been used to estimate the costs that it 
would be necessary to afford to protect the whole country. This explains why the estimate on the cost of 
implementation for the Italian case is expressed in terms of a range. In fact, it starts from the number of 
plants exceeding a given size, which is known, but then the protection requirements depend also on the use 
conditions; not all plants are run in conditions of continuity, and then for some of them the protection could 
not be judged a priority. 
In the Polish case study, concerning the national TSO, the whole country protection is included in the 
simulation. Starting from the simulation, some considerations on scalability have been done, so that it would 
be quickly possible to assess the cost concerning TSOs of different scales. This kind of analysis is impossible 
in the case of the generation system, because the cost depends on the features of the system (age, fuel type, 
scale, share of renewables, geographical diffusion) which differ a lot by country.  
As argued above (see §1.2) failures caused by cyber-attacks may take different forms, such as blackouts (loss 
of power lasting a period of time), brownouts (non-complete drop in voltage), transient faults (loss of power 
lasting few seconds), etc. Essence benefit analysis is focused on the form having the largest consequences. 
The simulation showed in fact that in both case studies an attack born in conditions of vulnerability lead to 
extended and durable blackouts in selected areas. Since security standards will hamper the huge 
inconveniences of a blackout, their benefits have been estimated as the economic and social damages that 
could be avoided implementing the correct countermeasures. 
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The estimates include impact on electricity firms, on other firms, and on households. As far as the productive 
sector, just losses in production (avoided income) are included in the figure, while direct damages to 
processes are not (although some qualitative evidence is available), since the values differ very much 
following the process and the type of firm. As for households, direct cost (for example food spoilage) and 
social cost is included, but not indirect effects (increased criminality, failures in providing other essential 
services). For this reason the estimate is a lower bound, prudent estimate. Benefits are always expressed as a 
range, from the more strict to the loosest assumptions that have been adopted. In the case of household, the 
“expected” value refers to every country “typical family”.  
The results raising from the two case studies and by the cost analysis and the benefit analysis run on them are 
summarized in Table 4. 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF COST AND BENEFIT ESTIMATES IN THE TWO CASE STUDIES (€ MILLION). 
 
*Min-Expected-Max 
 
Referring to the benefit analysis, it can be seen that the largest effects of the black-out are borne by families, 
followed by non-electricity firms. One could expect a greater difference between the two values. In effect at 
present small private users are the first to be re-supplied after a blackout9 because they are supposed to suffer 
the most from the lack of electricity. But even if a lot of attention has been put during the survey to get the 
consumer involved in the problem of security of supply, nowadays reliability is often taken for granted and 
                                                     
9 The Italian case study shows the priority given in the recovery plan: first residential users in big towns, then residential + tertiary in towns, 
then industrial customers, finally agriculture and rural users.  
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so the estimated value of the blackout is still under-evaluated. This perception would probably change a lot 
after a large blackout is experienced. Also electricity utilities suffer from the blackout, in terms of decreased 
sales, but the value of their damage is only a small fraction of the total. Actually, in many countries, utilities 
will pay a fee in case of interruptions in supply, but they have not been considered, because these 
indenisations (above all when they are bargained) are another way to estimate the effect of a blackout, and so 
including them in the calculations would have meant to count some effects twice.  
Considering the implementation costs, it can be seen that they are relevant both in transmission and in 
generation, but a relevant share of countermeasures has already been implemented by the two utilities 
participating to the project. The implementation of countermeasures will not only imply huge investments, 
but also increased maintenance costs.  
Comparing benefits to costs, it can be seen that even considering the most restrictive estimates of benefits 
and the highest estimates of costs, one single event would be enough to completely recover the total cost of 
implementing security standards both in generation and in transmission. Although it is nowadays impossible 
to estimate precisely the probability of such an event (see the paragraph below), it is widely acknowledged 
that this probability would strongly increase after the first time in which countermeasures are not able to 
block or mitigate an attack and their consequences are diffused and well echoed on media. This would in fact 
prove the feasibility of the attack and, above all, the visibility effect it carries with, which is mostly 
important for cyber-terrorists, unchaining an imitation effect leading to an escalation of attacks.  
4.2 The legacy of Essence: policy suggestions and open issues 
Essence conclusions give sound evidence to some perception and so they allow us to fix some important 
points in the discussion. But this is only the beginning of a process, and many question marks are still 
awaiting an answer. In particular the Essence approach, described in the introduction of this report, allows us 
to consider the estimates showed above as grounded in the reality, but this has gone to the detriment of the 
generality of results. This is why we are not ashamed of declaring that all our main conclusions call for 
further work for the sake of generality. The following paragraphs discuss then the main results emerging 
from the Essence case study, in the perspective of passing from specific results to an European view, and 
then form European evidence to regulation. 
4.2.1 Countermeasure actual implementation 
The case studies have shown that some of the countermeasures necessary to block cyber-attacks and to 
comply with security standards have already been adopted, so reducing sharply the cost of standard 
compliance for the two operators. But the perception is that the present situation in European countries is 
uneven. For this reason, it would be important to understand which is the current situation among other 
European utilities, and which are the investments already planned for the next future are, also showing the 
country specificities in the implementation process.  
This evidence is strongly necessary before thinking about any form of regulation. Simply imposing a 
standard won’t be easy. Defence is not a sector in which national governments are keen to accept common 
regulation. But, although threats to security are often felt as a national competency, not all member states 
have the financial and technical capabilities to comply in a consistent way with security requirements and 
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probably even fewer governments are able to identify and adopt a country specific strategy which could 
better fit the country specificities.  
The cost analysis also shows that the implementation process is more advanced in the case of the Polish 
TSO, in particular regarding investments; in fact while about half of the countermeasures concerning the 
governance of security (maintenance costs) have already been implemented in both cases, the Polish TSO 
has already incurred in 71% of the investment required for standard compliance, as opposed to the Italian 
case study, where it has been estimated that only something in-between 25%-29% of the required investment 
has been carried out. This is absolutely not a surprising result. There is in fact a more diffused perception of 
the grid as a critical infrastructure; as TSOs are public firms (or publicly controlled firms) with a strong 
commitment to quality of service, which includes reliability of supply. It is hardly imaginable that a grid 
operator asking to the body that controls it to invest to guarantee more security, would not be funded.  
On the other hand, generation companies act in a competition regime and will carry on just investments able 
to guarantee adequate returns. Our example showed clearly that the investment to implement security 
standards would not be the case, since the avoided damage in case of a big blackout for the generation firms 
is just a very small share of the security cost10. Moreover it must be considered that the engineering features 
of the electricity system, in particular the need for matching demand with supply in real time, imply that the 
global security level equals the one of the weakest node. For this reason, in a competitive market structure, 
no competitor is stimulated to invest on a voluntary basis, before that a common standard is established, and 
all firms are asked to comply with common minimal requirements.  
4.2.2 The choice among standards 
As it was already expected from the survey of existing or forthcoming standards, the work on the case-
studies let some insights emerge but didn’t allow to clearly indicate one - or two - most suitable standards. 
The detailed analysis showed that the main standards address the most important threats with rather similar 
countermeasures, but the technical requirements to devices may differ and the threats are not the same for the 
different operators.  
So the question whether to choose one single standard, or to set up different standards for the different parts 
of the electricity system, or if it is better to rely on more generic guidelines making each operator free in the 
choice of one standard is still an open issue. The final decision, which in our opinion is in charge of a 
supranational body, should be preceded by a long process, with a mission of reconnaissance of the strategies 
implemented up to now by single operators and of the specificities of the different needs, followed by a 
consultation phase, able to lead to a more generalized agreement. For example ENTSO-E (European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity) and its Technical Group on Critical System 
Protection which is also in charge of cyber security measures has already undertaken this process. Its twelve 
members are developing a common strategy which includes an information exchange platform - based on a 
private network - concerning threats and key mitigation strategies. A self-assessment survey among members 
took place last year and was the base to create a technical manual concerning Cyber Security and a tool to 
increase Cyber Security in three stages. Since firms are already investing in security, although at different 
                                                     
10 In the Italian simulation, although the total damage for the energy sector has been estimated equal to 1.3 M€ (which is a very small 
fraction of the total damage), the loss for generators amounts only to 0.6 M€. 
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extent as argued in §4.1.2, companies should also be helped to understand the inverse perspective, i.e. 
whether investment done before standardization will be useful for future compliance. In particular, is the 
countermeasure that a firm eventually adopts to comply with one special standard, useful in order to comply 
with other standards that would eventually be chosen later? How to assess, once a system is certified under 
Standard X, what more is needed to certify it under Standard Y? And how much will it cost? Recertification 
is generally very expensive and is one of the explanations of the reluctance of firms to invest in the pre-
regulation phase. This cost would be reduced, or nullified, in case an organization with high reputation could 
build official mapping tables between different standards. This detailed congruence analysis will be then a 
relevant direction of future research.  
4.2.3 Policy and regulation issues 
Estimated benefits largely exceed costs of implementation, even in the case of no existing investment. This is 
true even considering that our estimate of the damage caused by a blackout is a lower bound and it considers 
one single event (on the other hand multiple attacks are to be expected after the first one, because of 
increased visibility and of demonstrated feasibility).  
But the benefits are shared among different groups: the firms operating in the territory struck by the blackout 
and the society as a whole, and only a small part concerns the electricity utilities.  
From a profitability viewpoint, electric companies have no incentive to increase their security levels, as the 
cost of protections is much greater than the direct cost of a single blackout they should eventually suffer 
from. This explains their reluctance to afford such huge investments. Public regulation and support to firms 
operating in competitive branches of the energy sector is clearly necessary. Electricity supply security is a 
very important feature of the electric service, since our lives and economic activities have become more and 
more dependent on this commodity. This is related to the fact that supply security is a non-tradable public 
good, i.e. one of the causes of market failure. Public goods share the properties of non-rivalry and non-
exclusivity in consumption. Non-rivalry means that one individual consuming that good does not limit its use 
by other people. Non-exclusivity indicates that individuals cannot be excluded from consumption, in fact 
individuals could not choose to buy electricity plus security, or just electricity. For these characteristics, 
public goods are non-tradable, and firm tend to invest too little on them, nothing if they acted on a purely 
profit perspective. Market failures may be faced in different ways, such as public supply (as in the case of 
defence), regulation or support to private firms. All these options are interesting in the case of the security of 
the electricity system. So how to combine the possible options is another important open issue to be 
addressed by future research work and by consultations to the relevant stakeholders, after a reconnaissance 
of the tools that already exist in the present institutional framework at the national and EU level.  
This issue opens another relevant point that should be discussed in the following times: which is the best 
authority to be in charge of the regulation framework? And who should decide how to manage the support 
for standard compliance? While working on the process that will lead to security regulation, one of the topics 
to be decided is which parts of the governance are to be kept at the European level, and which shall be 
delegated to national authorities. The possible alternative implementation scenarios shall be assessed, 
without losing the contact with the concrete local situation and market assets. 
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